



Office of Intelligence and Analysis

**Homeland  
Security**

**Federal Bureau  
of Investigation**



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Joint Homeland Security Assessment

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## **(U) British Police Continue to Investigate Events in London**

**29 June 2007**

*(U//FOUO) Prepared by the Critical Infrastructure Threat Analysis Division and the Threat Analysis Unit, Federal Bureau of Investigation.*

### **(U) Key Developments**

*(U) Media reports indicate that British police responded to a call concerning a suspicious vehicle in the Haymarket area of London in the morning of 29 June 2007 and discovered a “potentially viable explosive device” that contained a mix of gasoline, nails, and two propane tanks.*

*(U//FOUO) Additionally, media reports indicate that authorities have located another suspicious vehicle at an underground garage at Hyde Park.*

*(U) Scotland Yard's antiterrorism unit has launched an investigation of the incident and forensics experts are examining the vehicle seized in the Haymarket area. No arrests have been made. For more than a year, the British Government has held the country's terrorist threat level at “Severe,” which means a terrorist attack is considered “highly likely.”*

*(U) The Haymarket area, near the Piccadilly Circus, contains London's theater district, shopping areas of Regent Street, and the Underground (Tube) station at Piccadilly—which has one exit closed as a precautionary measure.*

*(U) DHS and the FBI view the incident at Haymarket and the report of a suspicious vehicle at Hyde Park with concern.*

*(U) DHS and the FBI currently have no specific or credible intelligence indicating transnational terrorist groups are planning imminent attacks against targets in the Homeland. Nonetheless, DHS and the FBI urge recipients to maintain their high level of vigilance because extremists groups remain determined to strike the West, especially the United States.*

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## **(U//FOUO) Potential Indicators of Attack Planning Involving Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs)**

(U//FOUO) Given continued terrorist interest in VBIEDs, security officials should be aware of the potential indicators of a VBIED attack.

(U//FOUO) Potential indicators of an attack involving a VBIED include:

- (U//FOUO) Theft or purchase—particularly cash purchases from private individuals—of large delivery vehicles, vans, cargo containers, trailers or related equipment.
- (U//FOUO) Purchasing inquiries related to commercial delivery or utility vehicles by individuals who seem to lack industry knowledge, credentials, or experience.
- (U//FOUO) Suspicious employment attempts at sensitive sites, vehicle dealerships, vehicle rental agencies, delivery companies, security agencies, emergency services, or freight hauling companies.

## **(U//FOUO) Potential Operational Indicators of a VBIED Attack**

(U//FOUO) Operational indicators of a VBIED attack may include characteristics such as:

- (U) Erratic driving due to nervousness or stress, or engaging in noncompliant behavior, such as insisting on parking close to a building or in a restricted area, or abandoning the vehicle.
- (U) Delivery vehicles that lack a sufficient number of people to conduct the stated purpose of the visit; for example, a solo driver with a semitrailer sized delivery.
- (U) Excessive vehicle weight or unusually uneven weight distribution; for example, the vehicle leans to one side or appears overloaded.
- (U) Smoke or strong chemical or fuel odors emanating from a vehicle.

## **(U//FOUO) Possible Characteristics of a Vehicle Carrying an Improvised Explosive Device**

(U//FOUO) Characteristics of a VBIED attack vehicle might include those vehicles with:

- (U) Heavy or large payload capacity, such as tanker trucks.
- (U) Interiors whose contents are not visible, such as cargo vans.
- (U) Sufficient size to allow it to ram security barriers.
- (U) Access to high value symbolic or economic targets (i.e. limousine or buses).

(U//FOUO) Other characteristics the public and first responders should be alert for are vehicles that:

- (U) Can fit in parking garages (i.e. a large sedan or SUV).
- (U) Have easy licensing procedures (based on the size and purpose of the vehicle).
- (U) Can typically remain stationary for extended periods without drawing suspicion such as delivery vehicles.
- (U) Are recognized entity (recognized company delivery van) by the public.

## **(U) Protective Measures**

(U//FOUO) The following are the recommended general protective measures that apply to facilities with both controlled and uncontrolled access, and specific protective measures recommended for soft targets with controlled access.

### **(U//FOUO) General Protective Measures for Controlled and Uncontrolled Access:**

- (U) Security personnel and private citizens should be advised to remain vigilant in ensuring that large vehicles of any kind in the vicinity of critical infrastructure facilities are viewed as a security risk until proven otherwise.
- (U) Ensure all personnel are provided periodic security briefings regarding present and emerging threats.

## **(U//FOUO) Specific Protective Measures for Soft Targets with Controlled Access:**

(U//FOUO) Security personnel involved in protecting soft targets with controlled access should:

- (U) Be alert to the necessity for thoroughly checking large vehicles of any kind attempting to gain access to controlled critical infrastructure facilities.
- (U) Review existing vehicle bombing prevention procedures to thwart the potential use of a moving vehicle bomb, and consider adjusting buffer zones farther from potential targets.
- (U) Periodically rearrange exterior vehicle barriers, traffic cones, and road blocks to alter traffic patterns near facilities.
- (U) Limit the number of access points and strictly enforce access control procedures.
- (U) Approach all illegally parked vehicles in and around facilities, question drivers, and direct them to move immediately; if the owner cannot be identified, have vehicle towed by law enforcement.
- (U) Provide vehicle inspection training to security personnel, and institute a robust vehicle inspection program to include checking the undercarriage of vehicles, under the hood and in the trunk.
- (U) Deploy explosive detection devices and explosive detection canine teams.
- (U) Institute/increase security patrols varying in size, timing, and routes.
- (U) Increase perimeter lighting and maintain/remove vegetation in and around perimeters.
- (U) Encourage personnel to be alert and to immediately report any situation that appears to constitute a threat or suspicious activity.
- (U) Guard force turnover and personnel authentication procedures—implement random security guard shift changes.
- (U) Deploy visible security cameras and review security camera footage daily to detect possible indicators of pre-operational surveillance. Deploy motion sensors.

(U//FOUO) Although the FBI and DHS possess no information indicating VBIED bombings are currently being planned in the United States, raised awareness to this threat

could deter or thwart the would-be terrorist planning to use a VBIED. Security and law enforcement personnel should know the characteristics and indicators of VBIEDs and be consistently aware of their surroundings for any signs of suspicious activity.

## **(U) DHS and the FBI Will Continue to Develop Products on Enduring Terrorist Threats**

(U//FOUO) In light of this development, and the ongoing threat posed by al-Qa'ida and like-minded extremists, DHS and the FBI will continue to provide updated assessments that will highlight current terrorist tactics, techniques, and procedures. These assessments will examine:

- (U//FOUO) **Explosives:** Common explosive mixtures used by terrorists, including liquid explosives, the advantages and disadvantages they present to terrorists, and the opportunities for disruption based on the explosives' characteristics.
- (U//FOUO) **Targeting:** Elements of terrorist target selection based on information gained from disrupted plots and completed terrorist attacks.
- (U//FOUO) **General Tradecraft:** Common terrorist methodologies, specifically suicide bomber tradecraft, the use of "dry runs," and other preoperational surveillance by terrorist operatives.

(U//FOUO) These assessments will provide intelligence, law enforcement, and security personnel with actionable information based on demonstrated terrorist conduct. Additional assessments may be issued as warranted.

### **(U) Reporting Notice:**

(U) DHS and the FBI encourage recipients of this document to report information concerning suspicious or criminal activity to the local FBI Joint Terrorism Task Force and the National Operations Center (NOC). The FBI regional phone numbers can be found online at <http://www.fbi.gov/contact/fo/fo.htm>, and the NOC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9685 or via unclassified e-mail at [NOC.Fusion@hq.dhs.gov](mailto:NOC.Fusion@hq.dhs.gov). For information affecting the private sector and critical infrastructure, contact the National Infrastructure Coordinating Center (NICC), a sub-element of the NOC. The NICC can be reached by telephone at 202-282-9201 or by unclassified e-mail at [NICC@dhs.gov](mailto:NICC@dhs.gov). When available, each report submitted should include the date, time, location, type of activity, number of people and type of equipment used for the activity, the name of the submitting company or organization, and a designated point of contact.

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